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Abstract. We present the Neural Simplex Architecture (NSA), a new
approach to runtime assurance that provides safety guarantees for neu-
ral controllers (obtained e.g. using reinforcement learning) of autonomous
and other complex systems without unduly sacrificing performance. NSA
is inspired by the Simplex control architecture of Sha et al., but with
some significant differences. In the traditional approach, the advanced
controller (AC) is treated as a black box; when the decision module
switches control to the baseline controller (BC), the BC remains in con-
trol forever. There is relatively little work on switching control back to
the AC, and there are no techniques for correcting the AC’s behavior
after it generates a potentially unsafe control input that causes a failover
to the BC. Our NSA addresses both of these limitations. NSA not only
provides safety assurances in the presence of a possibly unsafe neural
controller, but can also improve the safety of such a controller in an on-
line setting via retraining, without overly degrading its performance. To
demonstrate NSA’s benefits, we have conducted several significant case
studies in the continuous control domain. These include a target-seeking
ground rover navigating an obstacle field, and a neural controller for an
artificial pancreas system.
Keywords: Runtime assurance · Simplex architecture · Online retrain-
ing · Reverse switching · Safe reinforcement learning.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) in combination with reinforcement learning (RL)
are increasingly being used to train powerful AI agents. Such agents have achieved
unprecedented success in strategy games, including defeating the world cham-
pion in Go [30] and surpassing state-of-the-art chess and shogi engines [29]. For
these agents, safety is not an issue: when a game-playing agent makes a mistake,
the worst-case scenario is losing a game. The same cannot be said for AI agents
that control autonomous and other complex systems. A mistake by an AI con-
troller may cause physical damage to the controlled system and its environment,
including humans.
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Fig. 1. The Neural Simplex Architecture. The green check marks indicate pre-certified
components.
In this paper, we present the Neural Simplex Architecture (NSA), a new ap-
proach to runtime assurance that provides safety guarantees for AI controllers,
including neural controllers, of autonomous and other complex systems without
unduly sacrificing performance. NSA is inspired by Sha et al.’s Simplex control
architecture [28, 26], where a pre-certified decision module (DM) switches con-
trol from a high-performance but unverified (hence potentially unsafe) advanced
controller (AC) to a verified-safe baseline controller (BC) if the AC produces an
unrecoverable action; i.e., an action that would lead the system within one time
step to a state from which the BC is not guaranteed to preserve safety.
In the traditional Simplex approach, the AC is treated as a black box, and
after the DM switches control to the BC, the BC remains in control forever.
There is, however, relatively little work on switching control back to the AC
[18, 10, 34], and there are no techniques to correct the AC after it generates an
unrecoverable control input.
NSA, illustrated in Fig. 1, addresses both of these limitations. The high-
performance Neural Controller (NC) is a deep neural network (DNN) that given
a plant state (or raw sensor readings), produces a control input for the plant.
NSA’s use of an NC, as opposed to the black-box AC found in traditional Sim-
plex, allows for online retraining of the NC’s DNN. Such retraining is performed
by NSA’s Adaptation Module (AM) using RL techniques. For systems with large
state spaces, it may be difficult to achieve thorough coverage during initial train-
ing of the NC. Online retraining has the advantage of focusing the learning on
areas of the state space that are relevant to the actual system behavior, i.e.,
regions of the state space the system actually visits.
The AM seeks to eliminate unrecoverable actions from the NC’s behavior,
without unduly degrading its performance, and in some cases actually improv-
ing its performance. While the BC is in control of the plant, the NC runs in
shadow mode and is actively retrained by the AM. The DM can subsequently
switch control back to the NC with high confidence that it will not repeat the
same mistakes, permitting the mission to continue under the auspices of the
high-performance NC. Note that because NSA preserves the basic principles of
Simplex architecture, it guarantees that the safety of the plant is never violated.
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NSA addresses the problem of safe reinforcement learning (SRL) [15, 38]. In
particular, when the learning agent (the NC) produces an unrecoverable action,
the AM uses that action as a training sample (but does not execute it), with a
large negative reward. A comparison with related approaches to SRL is provided
in Section 6.
We conducted an extensive evaluation of NSA on several significant example
systems, including a target-seeking rover navigating through an obstacle field,
and a neural controller for an artificial pancreas. Our results on these case studies
conclusively demonstrate NSA’s benefits.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are the following:
– We introduce the Neural Simplex Architecture, a new approach to runtime
assurance that provides safety guarantees for neural controllers.
– We address two limitations of the traditional Simplex approach, namely lack
of established guidelines for switching control back to the AC so that mission
completion can be attained; and lack of techniques for correcting the AC’s
behavior after a failover to the BC, so that reverse switching makes sense in
the first place.
– We provide a key insight into safe reinforcement learning (by demonstrat-
ing the utility of potentially unsafe training samples, when appropriately
and significantly penalized), along with a thorough evaluation of the NSA
approach on two significant case studies.
2 Background
Simplex Architecture. The main components of the Simplex architecture (AC,
BC, DM) were introduced above. The BC is certified to guarantee the safety
of the plant only if it takes over control while the plant’s state is within a
recoverable region RBC . For example, consider the BC for a ground rover that
simply applies maximum deceleration amax. The braking distance to stop the
rover from a velocity v is therefore dbr(v) = v
2/(2·amax). The BC can be certified
to prevent the rover from colliding with an obstacle if it takes over control in a
state where dbr(v) is less than the minimum distance dmin to any obstacle. The
set of such states is the recoverable region of this BC.
A control input is called recoverable if it keeps the plant inside RBC within
the next time step. Otherwise, the control input is called unrecoverable. The
DM switches control to the BC when the AC produces an unrecoverable con-
trol input. The DM’s switching condition determines whether a control input is
unrecoverable. We also refer to it as the forward switching condition (FSC) to
distinguish it from the condition for reverse switching, a new feature of NSA.
Techniques to determine the FSC include: (i) shrink RBC by an amount
equal to a time step times the maximum gradient of the state with respect to
the control input; then classify any control input as unrecoverable if the current
state is outside this smaller region; (ii) simulate a model of the plant for one
time step if the model is deterministic and check whether the plant strays from
RBC ; (iii) compute a set of states reachable within one time step and determine
whether the reachable set contains states outside RBC .
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Reinforcement Learning. Reinforcement learning [32] deals with the problem
of how an agent learns which sequence of actions to take in a given environ-
ment such that a cumulative reward is maximized. At each time step t, the
agent receives observation st (the environment state) and reward rt from the
environment and takes action at. The environment receives action at and emits
observation st+1 and reward rt+1 in response. In the control of autonomous sys-
tems, the agent represents the controller, the environment represents the plant,
and the state and action spaces are typically continuous.
The goal of RL is to learn a policy pi(a | s), i.e., a way of choosing an action
a having observed s, that maximizes the expected return from the initial state,
where the return at time t is defined as the discounted sum of future rewards from
t (following policy pi): Rt =
∑∞
k=t γ
k−trk+1; here γ ∈ [0, 1] is a discount factor.
For this purpose, RL algorithms typically involve estimating the action-value
function Qpi(s, a) = E[Rt | st = s, a], i.e., the expected return for selecting action
a in state s and then always following policy pi; and the state-value function
V pi(s) = E[Rt | st = s], i.e., the expected return starting from s and following pi.
While early RL algorithms were designed for discrete state and action spaces,
recent deep RL algorithms, such as TRPO [25], DDPG [19], A3C [21], and
ACER [36], have emerged as promising solutions for RL-based control prob-
lems in continuous domains. These algorithms leverage the expressiveness of
deep neural networks (DNNs) to represent policies and value functions.
3 Neural Simplex Architecture
In this section, we discuss the main components of NSA, namely the neural con-
troller (NC), the adaptation module (AM), and the reverse switching logic. These
components in particular are not found in the Simplex control architecture.
The dynamics of the plant, i.e., the system under control, is given by st+1 =
f(st, at), where st ∈ S is the state of the plant at time t, S ⊆ Rn is the real-
valued state space, f is a possibly nonlinear function, and at ∈ A is the control
input to the plant at time t, with A ⊆ Rm the action space. This equation
specifies a deterministic dynamics, even though our approach equally supports
nondeterministic (st+1 ∈ fnd(st, at)) and stochastic (st+1 ∼ fst(s | st, at)) plant
dynamics. We assume full observability, i.e., that the BC and NC have access to
the full state of the system st.
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We denote with DMt ∈ {NC,BC} the state of the decision module at time
t: DMt = NC (DMt = BC) indicates that the neural (baseline) controller is in
control. Let aNCt and a
BC
t denote the action computed by the NC and the BC,
respectively. The final action at performed by the NSA agent depends on the
DM state: at = a
NC
t if DMt = NC, at = a
BC
t if DMt = BC.
Let β be the BC’s control law, i.e., aBCt = β(st). For a set of unsafe states
U ⊆ S, the recoverable region is the largest set RBC such that s ∈ RBC ⇒
5 In case of partial observability, the full state can typically be reconstructed from
sequences of past states and actions, but this process is error-prone.
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f(s, β(s)) ∈ RBC and RBC ∩ U = ∅. For s ∈ S, a ∈ A, the forward switching
condition must satisfy f(s, a) 6∈ RBC ⇒ FSC(s, a).
The Neural Controller. The NC is represented by a DNN-based policy piθt , where
θt are the current DNN parameters. The policy maps the current state into a
proposed action aNCt = piθt(st). We stress the time dependency of the parameters
because adaptation and retraining of the policy is a key feature of NSA. As for
the dynamics f , our approach supports stochastic policies (aNCt ∼ pi(a | st, θt)).
The NC can be obtained using any RL algorithm. We used DDPG with the
safe learning strategy of penalizing unrecoverable actions, as discussed in Sec-
tion 4. DDPG is attractive as it works with deterministic policies, and allows
uncorrelated samples to be added to the pool of samples for training or retrain-
ing. The latter property is important because it allows us to collect disconnected
samples of what the NC would do while the plant is under the BC’s control, and
to use these samples for online retraining of the NC.
Adaptation and Retraining. The AM is used to retrain the NC in an online
manner while the BC is in control of the plant (due to NC-to-BC failover).
The main purpose of this retraining is to make the NC less likely to trigger the
FSC, thereby allowing it to remain in control for longer periods of time, thereby
improving overall system performance.
Techniques that we consider for online retraining of the NC include super-
vised learning and reinforcement learning. In supervised learning, state-action
pairs of the form (s, a) are required for training purposes. The training algorithm
uses these examples to teach the NC safe behavior. The control inputs produced
by the BC can be used as training samples, although this will train the NC to
imitate BC’s behavior, which may lead to a loss in performance.
We therefore prefer SRL for online retraining, with a reward function that
penalizes unrecoverable actions and rewards recoverable, high-performing ones.
The reward function for retraining can be designed as follows.
r(s, a, s′) =
{
runrecov , if FSC(s, a)
rperf (s, a, s
′), otherwise
(1)
where rperf (s, a, s
′) is a performance-related reward function, and runrecov is a
negative number used to penalize unrecoverable actions. The benefits of this
approach to SRL are discussed in Section 4.
The AM retrains the NC at each time step the BC is in control by maintaining
a pool of retraining samples of the form (st, a
NC
t , s
′, r′), where aNCt is the NC-
proposed action, s′ = f(st, aNCt ) is the state that the system would evolve to if
the NC was in control, and r′ = r(s, aNCt , s
′) is the corresponding reward. I.e.,
samples are obtained by running the NC in shadow mode: when BC is in control,
the AM obtains a retraining sample by running a simulation of the system for
one time step and applying aNCt , while the actual system evolves according to
the BC action aBCt .
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The AM updates the NC’s parameters θt as follows:
θt =
{
RL(θt−1, (st, aNCt , s
′, r′)), if DMt = BC
θt−1, otherwise
where RL is the deep RL algorithm chosen for NC adaptation. Note that as soon
as the DM switches control to the BC after the NC has produced an unrecov-
erable action (see also the Switching logic paragraph below), a corresponding
retraining sample for the NC’s action is added to the pool.
We evaluated a number of variants of this procedure by making different
choices along the following dimensions.
1. Start retraining with an empty pool of samples or with the pool created
during the initial training of the NC.
2. Add (or do not add) exploration noise to NC’s action when collecting a
sample. With exploration noise, the resulting action is aNCt + νt, where νt is
a random noise term. Note that we consider noise only when NC is running
in shadow mode (BC in control), as directly using noisy actions to control
the plant would degrade performance.
3. Collect retraining samples only while BC is in control or at every time step.
In both cases, the action in each training sample is the action output by
NC (or a noisy version of it); we never use BC’s action in a training sample.
Also, in both cases, the retraining algorithm for updating the NC is run only
while the BC is in control.
We found that reusing the pool of training samples (DDPG’s so-called experience
replay buffer) from initial training of the NC helps evolve the policy in a more
stable way, as retraining samples gradually replace initial training samples in
the sample pool. Another benefit of reusing the initial training pool is that the
NC can be immediately retrained without having to wait for enough samples to
be collected online. We found that adding exploration noise to NC’s actions in
retraining samples, and collecting retraining samples at every time step, both
increase the benefit of retraining. This is because these two strategies provide
more diverse samples and thereby help achieve more thorough exploration of the
state-action space.
Switching logic. NSA includes reverse switching from the BC to the retrained
NC. An additional benefit of well-designed reverse switching is that it lessens the
burden on the BC to achieve performance objectives, leading to a simpler BC
design that focuses mainly on safety. Control of the plant is returned to the NC
when the reverse switching condition (RSC) is true in the current state. We can
summarize NSA’s switching logic by describing the evolution of the DM state
DMt. NSA begins with the NC in control, i.e., DMt = NC for t ≤ 0. For t > 0,
the DM state is given by:
DMt =

BC, if DMt−1 = NC and FSC(st, aNCt )
NC, if DMt−1 = BC and RSC(st)
DMt−1, otherwise
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Fig. 2. Switching boundaries. The blue region is a subset of the orange area, which in
turn is a subset of the green region.
To ensure safety when returning control to the NC, the FSC must not hold if
the RSC is satisfied, i.e., RSC(s)⇒ ¬FSC(s, a), for all s ∈ S, a ∈ A.
We seek to develop reverse switching logic that returns control to NC when
it is safe to do so and which avoids frequent back-and-forth switching between
the BC and NC. We propose two such approaches. One is to reverse-switch
if a forward switch will not occur in the near future. This can be checked
by simulating the composition of the NC and plant for T time steps, and
reverse-switching if the FSC does not hold within this time horizon.6 Formally,
RSC(st) =
∧t+T
t′=t ¬FSC(s′t′ , piθt(s′t′)), where s′t = st and s′t′+1 = f(s′t′ , piθt(s′t′)).
This approach, used in our inverted pendulum and artificial pancreas case stud-
ies, prevents frequent switching.
A simpler approach is to reverse-switch if the current plant state is sufficiently
far from the NC-to-BC switching boundary; see Fig. 2. Formally, RSC(st) =
sup{d(st, s′) | s′ ∈ S, FSC(s′, piθt(s′))} > , where d is a metric on Rn and
 ∈ R+ is the desired distance. This approach is used in our rover case study.
We emphasize that the choice of RSC does not affect safety and is application-
dependent. Note that both of our approaches construct an RSC that is stricter
than a straight complement of the FSC. This helps avoid excessive switching. In
our experiments, we empirically observed that the system behavior was not very
sensitive to the exact value of T or ; so choosing acceptable values for them is
not difficult.
4 Safe Reinforcement Learning with Penalized
Unrecoverable Continuous Actions
We evaluate the use of two policy-gradient algorithms for safe reinforcement
learning in NSA. The first approach filters the learning agent’s unrecoverable
actions before they reach the plant. For example, when the learning agent, i.e.,
the NC, produces an unrecoverable action, a runtime monitor [13] or a preemp-
tive shield [3] replaces it with a recoverable one to continue the trajectory. The
6 For nondeterministic (stochastic) systems, a (probabilistic) model checker can be
used instead of a simulator, but this approach may be computationally expensive.
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recoverable action is also passed to the RL algorithm to update the agent and
training continues with the rest of the trajectory.
In the second approach, when the learning agent produces an unrecoverable
action, we assign a penalty (negative reward) to the action, use it as a training
sample, and then use recoverable actions to safely terminate the trajectory (but
not to train the agent). Safely terminating the trajectory is important in cases
where for example the live system is used for training. We call this approach safe
reinforcement learning with penalized unrecoverable continuous actions (SRL-
PUA). By “continuous” here we mean real-valued action spaces, as in [9]. Other
SRL approaches such as [2] use discrete actions.
To compare the two approaches, we used the DDPG and TRPO algorithms
to train neural controllers for an inverted pendulum (IP) control system. Details
about our IP case study, including the reward function and the BC used to
generate recoverable actions, can be found in [24].
We used the implementations of DDPG and TRPO in rllab [11]. For TRPO,
we trained two DNNs, one for the mean and the other for the standard deviation
of a Gaussian policy. Both DNNs have two fully connected hidden layers of 32
neurons each and one output layer. The hidden layers use the tanh activation
function, and the output layer is linear. For DDPG, we trained a DNN that
computes the action directly from the state. The DNN has two fully connected
hidden layers of 32 neurons each and one output layer. The hidden layers use
the ReLU activation function, and the output layer uses tanh. We followed the
choice of activation functions in the examples accompanying rllab.
For each algorithm, we ran two training experiments. In one experiment,
we reproduce the filtering approach; i.e., we replace an unrecoverable action
produced by the learning agent with the BC’s recoverable action, use the latter
as the training sample, and continue the trajectory. We call this training method
SRL-BC. In the other experiment, we evaluate the SRL-PUA approach. Note
that both algorithms explore different trajectories by resetting the system to
a random initial state whenever the current trajectory is terminated. We set
the maximum trajectory length to 500 time steps, meaning that a trajectory is
terminated when it exceeds 500 time steps.
We trained the DDPG and TRPO agents on a total of one million time
steps. After training, we evaluated all trained policies on the same set of 1,000
random initial states. During evaluation, if an agent produces an unrecoverable
action, the trajectory is terminated. The results are shown in Table 1. For both
algorithms, the policies trained with recoverable actions (the SRL-BC approach)
produce unrecoverable actions in all test trajectories, while the SRL-PUA ap-
proach, where the policies are trained with penalties for unrecoverable actions,
does not produce any such actions. As such, the latter policies achieve superior
returns and trajectory lengths (they are able to safely control the system the
entire time).
In the above experiments, we replaced unrecoverable actions with actions
generated by a deterministic BC, whereas the monitoring [13] and preemptive
shielding [2] approaches allow unrecoverable actions to be replaced with random
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recoverable ones, an approach we refer to as SRL-RND. To show that our con-
clusions are independent of this difference, we ran one more experiment with
each learning algorithm, in which we replaced each unrecoverable action with an
action selected by randomly generating actions until a recoverable one is found.
The results, shown in Table 2, once again demonstrate that training with only
recoverable actions is ineffective. Compared to filtering-based approaches (SRL-
BC in Table 1 and SRL-RND in Table 2), the SRL-PUA approach yields a 25-
to 775-fold improvement in the average return.
TRPO DDPG
SRL-BC SRL-PUA SRL-BC SRL-PUA
Unrec Trajs 1,000 0 1,000 0
Comp Trajs 0 1,000 0 1,000
Avg. Return 112.53 4,603.97 61.52 4,596.04
Avg. Length 15.15 500 14.56 500
Table 1. Policy performance comparison. SRL-BC: policy trained with BC’s actions
replacing unrecoverable ones. SRL-PUA: policy trained with penalized unsafe actions.
Unrec Trajs: # trajectories terminated due to an unrecoverable action. Comp Trajs:
# trajectories that reach the limit of 500 time steps. Avg. Return and Avg. Length:
average return and trajectory length over 1,000 trajectories.
TRPO DDPG
SRL-RND SRL-PUA SRL-RND SRL-PUA
Unrec Trajs 1,000 0 1,000 0
Comp Trajs 0 1,000 0 1,000
Avg. Return 183.36 4,603.97 5.93 4,596.04
Avg. Length 1.93 500 14 500
Table 2. Policy performance comparison. SRL-RND: policy trained with random
recoverable actions replacing unrecoverable ones.
5 Case Studies
An additional case study, the Inverted Pendulum, along with further details
about the case studies presented in this section can be found in [24].
5.1 Rover Navigation
We consider the problem of navigating a rover to a predetermined target loca-
tion while avoiding collisions with static obstacles. The rover is a circular disk
of radius r. It has a maximum speed vmax and a maximum acceleration amax.
The maximum braking time is therefore tbr max = vmax/amax, and the maxi-
mum braking distance is dbr max = v
2
max/(2 · amax). The control inputs are the
accelerations ax and ay in the x and y directions, respectively. The system uses
discrete-time control with a time step of dt.
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The rover has n distance sensors whose detection range is lmax. The sensors
are placed evenly around the perimeter of the rover; i.e., the center lines of sight
of two adjacent sensors form an angle of 2pi/n. The rover can only move forwards,
so its orientation is the same as its heading angle. The state vector for the rover
is [x, y, θ, v, l1, l2, ..., ln], where (x, y) is the position, θ is the heading angle, v is
the velocity, and the li’s are the sensor readings.
O




  
Fig. 3. Illustration of assumptions about obstacle shapes.
We assume the sensors have a small angular field-of-view so that each sensor
reading reflects the distance from the rover to an obstacle along the sensor’s
center line of sight. If a sensor does not detect an obstacle, its reading is lmax.
We also assume that when the sensor readings of two adjacent sensors si and
sj are li and lj , respectively, then the (conservative) minimum distance to any
obstacle point located in the cone formed by the center lines of sight of si and
sj is min{li, lj} − . Here,  is a constant that limits by how much an obstacle
can protrude into the blind spot between si and sj ’s lines of sight; see Fig. 3.
A state s of the rover is recoverable if starting from s, the baseline controller
(BC) can brake to a stop at least distance dsafe from any obstacle. Let the
braking distance in state s be dbr(s) = v
2/(2 ·amax), where v is the rover’s speed
in s. Then s is recoverable if the minimum sensor reading lmin in state s is at
least dsafe + dbr(s) + .
The FSC holds when the control input uNC proposed by the NC will put the
rover in an unrecoverable state in the next time step. We check this condition
by simulating the rover for one time step with uNC as the control input, and by
then determining if lmin < dsafe + dbr(s) + .
The RSC is lmin ≥ m · vmax · dt+ dsafe + dbr max + , ensuring that the FSC
does not hold for the next m − 1 time steps. Parameter m can be chosen to
reduce excessive back-and-forth switching between the NC and BC.
The BC performs the following steps: 1) Apply the maximum braking power
amax until the rover stops. 2) Randomly pick a safe heading angle θ based on the
current position and sensor readings. 3) Rotate the rover until its heading angle
is θ. 4) Move with heading angle θ until either the FSC becomes true (this is
checked after each time step by the BC itself), in which case the BC is re-started
at Step 1, or the RSC becomes true (this is checked by the DM), in which case
the NC takes over.
Experimental Results. Parameter values used: r = 0.1 m, vmax = 0.8 m/s,
amax = 1.6 m/s
2, lmax = 2 m, n = 32, dsafe = 0.2 m,  = 0.01 m, m = 5,
dt = 0.1 s. The target is a circular disk at location (0, 0) with a radius of 0.1m.
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The obstacle field, which is fixed during training and testing, consists of 12 cir-
cular obstacles with a minimum radius of 0.25m. Rover initial position (x0, y0)
is randomized in the area [−5, 5]× [−5, 5]. 7 We assume that the sensor field-of-
view is at least 7.25◦, thereby satisfying the assumption that an obstacle does
not protrude more than  into the blind spot between adjacent sensors. See also
Fig. 3. The NC is a DNN with two ReLU hidden layers, each of size 64, and a
tanh output layer. We used the DDPG algorithm for both initial training and
online retraining of the NC. For initial training, we ran DDPG for 5 million time
steps. The reward function for initial training and online retraining is:
r(s, a, s′) =

−20, 000, if FSC(s, a)
10, 000, if DT(s) ≤ 0.2
−1− 20 ·DT(s), otherwise
(2)
where FSC(s, a) is the forward switching condition and DT(s) is the center-to-
center distance from the rover to the target in state s. The rover is considered
to have reached the target if DT(s) ≤ 0.2, as, recall, the target is a circular
disk with radius of 0.1m and the radius r of the rover is 0.1m. If the action a
triggers the forward switching logic, it is penalized by assigning it a negative
reward of -20,000. If a causes the rover to reach the target, it receives a positive
reward of 10,000. All other actions are penalized by an amount proportional to
the distance to the target, encouraging the agent to reach the target quickly.
Our experiments with online retraining use the same DDPG settings as in
initial training, except that we initialize the AM’s pool of retraining samples with
the pool created by initial training, instead of an empty pool. The pool created
by initial training contains one million samples; this is the maximum pool size,
which is a parameter of the algorithm. When creating retraining samples, the AM
adds Gaussian noise to the NC’s actions. The NC’s actions are collected (added
to the pool) at every time step, regardless of which controller is in control; thus,
the AM also collects samples of what the NC would do while the BC is in control.
We ran the NSA instance starting from 10,000 random initial states. Out
of 10,000 trajectories, forward switching occurred in 456 of them. Of these 456
trajectories, the BC was in control for a total of 70,974 time steps. This means
there were 70,974 (∼71K) retraining updates to the NC. To evaluate the benefits
of online retraining, we compared the performance of the NC after initial training
and after 20K, 50K, and 71K online updates. We evaluated the performance of
each of these controllers (by itself, without NSA) by running it from the same
set of 1,000 random initial states.
The results in Table 3 show that after 71K retraining updates, the NC out-
performs the initially trained version on every metric. Table 3 also shows that
the NC’s performance increases with the number of retraining updates, thus
demonstrating that NSA’s online retraining not only improves the safety of the
NC, but also its performance.
7 Although the obstacles are fixed, the NC still generalizes well (but not per-
fectly) to random obstacle fields not seen during training, as shown in this video
https://youtu.be/ICT8D1uniIw.
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IT 20K RT 50K RT 71K RT
FSCs 100 79 43 8
Timeouts 35 49 50 22
Targets 865 872 907 970
Avg. Ret. -9,137.3 -9,968.8 -5,314.6 -684.0
Avg. Len. 138.67 142.29 156.13 146.56
Table 3. Benefits of online retraining (∼71K NC updates in total) for ground rover
navigation. IT: results for initially trained NC. 20K RT, 50K RT, 71K RT: results
for NC after 20K, 50K, 71K retraining updates. All controllers evaluated on same
set of 1,000 random initial states. FSCs: # trajectories in which FSC becomes true.
Timeouts: # trajectories that reach the limit of 500 time steps without reaching target
or having FSC become true. Targets: # trajectories that reach the target. Avg. Ret.
and Avg. Len.: average return and average trajectory length over all 1,000 trajectories.
We resumed initial training to see if this would produce similar improve-
ments. Specifically, we continued the initial training for an additional 71K, 1M,
and 3M samples. The results, included in [24], show that extending the initial
training slowly improves both the safety and performance of the NC but requires
substantially more updates. 71K retraining updates provide significantly more
benefits than even 3M additional samples of initial training.
5.2 Artificial Pancreas
The artificial pancreas (AP) is used to control blood glucose (BG) levels in
Type 1 diabetes patients through automated delivery of insulin. We use the
linear plant model of [6] to describe the physiological state of the patient. The
main state variable of interest is G, which is the difference between the reference
BG (7.8 mmol/L) and the patient’s BG. The control action, i.e., the insulin input,
is denoted by u. Further details of this model, including its ODE dynamics, can
be found in [24].
The AP should maintain BG levels within the safe range of 4 to 11 mmol/L.
In particular, it should avoid hypoglycemia (i.e., BG levels below the safe range),
which can lead to severe health consequences. Hypoglycemia occurs when the
controller overshoots the insulin dose. Insulin control is uniquely challenging
because the controller cannot take a corrective action to counteract an excessive
dose; its most extreme safety measure is to turn off the insulin pump. Hence,
the baseline controller for the AP sets u = 0.
We intentionally under-train the initial NC so that it exhibits low perfor-
mance and produces unrecoverable actions. Low-performing AP controllers may
arise in practice for several reasons, e.g., when the training-time model param-
eters do not match the current real-life patient parameters.
The reward function r is designed to penalize deviations from the reference
BG level, as captured by state variable G. We assign a positive reward when G
is close to zero (within ±1), and we penalize larger deviations with a 5× fac-
tor for mild hyperglycemia (1 < G ≤ 3.2), a 7× factor for mild hypoglycemia
(−3.8 ≤ G < −1), 9× for strong hyperglycemia (G > 3.2), and 20× for strong
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hypoglycemia (G < −3.8). The other constants are chosen to avoid jump dis-
continuities in the reward function.
r(s, u, s′) =

10− |G′|, if |G′| ≤ 1
14− 5 · |G′|, if 1 < G′ ≤ 3.2
26.8− 9 · |G′|, if G′ > 3.2
16− 7 · |G′|, if − 3.8 ≤ G′ < −1
65.4− 20 · |G′| otherwise
where G′ is the value of G in state s′.
An AP plant state s is recoverable if under the control of the BC, a state where
G′ < −3.8 cannot be reached starting from s. This condition can be checked by
simulation. The FSC holds when the NC’s action leads to an unrecoverable state
in the next time step. For reverse switching, we return control to the NC if the
FSC does not hold within time T = 10 from the current state.
Experimental Results. To produce an under-trained NC, we used 107,000 time
steps of initial training. We ran NSA on the under-trained controller on 10,000
trajectories, each starting from a random initial state. Among the first 400 tra-
jectories, 250 led to forward switching and hence retraining. The retraining was
very effective, as forward switching did not occur after the first 400 trajectories.
As in the other case studies we conducted, we then evaluated the benefits
of retraining by comparing the performance of the initially trained NC and
the retrained NC on trajectories starting from the same set of 1,000 random
initial states. The results are given in Table 4. Retraining greatly improves the
safety of the NC: the initially trained controller reaches an unrecoverable state
in all 1,000 of these trajectories, while the retrained controller never does. The
retrained controller’s performance is also significantly enhanced, with an average
return 2.9 times that of the initial controller.
Initially Trained Retrained
Unrecov Trajs 1,000 0
Complete Trajs 0 1,000
Avg. Return 824 2,402
Avg. Length 217 500
Table 4. Benefits of retraining for the AP case study. There were 61 updates to the
NC. Row labels are as per Table 1.
6 Related Work
The original Simplex architecture did not consider reverse switching. In [27,
26], when the AC produces an unrecoverable action, it is disabled until it is
manually re-enabled. It is briefly mentioned in [18] that reverse switching should
be performed only when the FSC is false, and that a stricter RSC might be
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needed to prevent frequent switching, but the paper does not pursue this idea
further. A more general approach to reverse switching, which uses reachability
analysis to determine if the plant is safe in the next two time steps irrespective
of the controller, is presented in [10]. This approach results in more conservative
reverse switching conditions, as it does not take the behavior of the AC into
account, unlike one of the approaches we propose. The idea of reverse switching
when the AC’s outputs are stabilized is briefly mentioned in [34].
Regarding approaches to safe reinforcement learning (SRL), we refer the
reader to two recent comprehensive literature reviews [15, 38]. Bootstrapping of
policies that are known to be safe in certain environments is employed in [31],
while [16] restricts exploration to a portion of the state space close to an optimal,
pre-computed policy.
In [3], the authors synthesize a shield (a.k.a. post-posed shield) from a temporal-
logic safety specification based on knowledge of the system dynamics. The shield
monitors and corrects an agent’s actions to ensure safety. This approach targets
systems with finite state and action spaces. Suitable finite-state abstractions are
needed for infinite-state systems. In [5], the shield-based approach is extended to
stochastic systems. In contrast, NSA’s policy-gradient-based approach is directly
applicable to systems with infinite state spaces and continuous action spaces.
In [13], the authors use formally verified runtime monitors in the RL training
phase to constrain the actions taken by the learning agent to a set of safe actions.
The idea of using the learned policy together with a known-safe fallback policy
in the deployed system is mentioned, but further details are not provided. In
contrast, we discuss in detail how the NSA approach guarantees runtime safety
and how SRL is is used for online retraining of the NC. In [14], a verification-
preserving procedure is proposed for learning updates to the environment model
when SRL is used and the exact model is not initially known. The approach to
SRL is mainly taken from [13], so again the learned policy is not guaranteed
safe. Note that the SRL approach of [13, 14] allows the training algorithm to
speculate when the plant model is deviating from reality.
Other approaches to SRL incorporate formal methods to constrain the SRL
exploration process. These include the use of (probabilistic) temporal logic [37,
17, 20], ergodicity-based notions of safety [22], and providing probably approx-
imately correct (PAC) guarantees [12]. All of these techniques work on finite
state spaces.
In [8], the authors use Lyapunov functions in the framework of constrained
Markov decision processes to guarantee policy safety during training. They focus
on policy-iteration and Q-learning for discrete state and action problems. Their
approach is currently not applicable to policy-gradient algorithms, such as the
DDPG algorithm used in our experiments, nor continuous state/action problems.
Lyapuanov functions are also used in [4] for SRL, but it likewise cannot be used
for policy-gradient algorithms.
In [33], the authors propose Reward Constrained Policy Optimization (RCPO),
where a per-state weighted penalty term is added to the reward function. Such
weights are updated during training. RCPO is shown to almost surely converge
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to a solution, but does not address the problem of guaranteeing safety during
training. In contrast, we penalize unrecoverable actions and safely terminate the
current trajectory to ensure plant safety.
In [1], the authors present the Constrained Policy Optimization algorithm for
constrained MDPs, which guarantees safe exploration during training. CPO only
ensures approximate satisfaction of constraints and provides an upper bound on
the cost associated with constraint violations. In [23], the authors use control
barrier functions (CBFs) for SRL. Whenever the learning agent produces an
unsafe action, it is minimally perturbed to preserve safety. In contrast, in NSA,
when the NC proposes an unsafe action, the BC takes over and the NC is re-
trained by the AM. CBFs are also used in [7].
Similar to the shield-based method, a safety layer is inserted between the pol-
icy and the plant in [9]. Like the CBF approach, the safety layer uses quadratic
programming to minimally perturb the action to ensure safety. There are, how-
ever, no formal guarantees of safety because of the data-driven linearization of
the constraint function.
7 Conclusions
We have presented the Neural Simplex Architecture for assuring the runtime
safety of systems with neural controllers. NSA features an adaptation module
that retrains the NC in an online fashion, seeking to eliminate its faulty behav-
ior without unduly sacrificing performance. NSA’s reverse switching capability
allows control of the plant to be returned to the NC after a failover to BC,
thereby allowing NC’s performance benefits to come back into play. We have
demonstrated the utility of NSA on three significant case studies in the contin-
uous control domain.
As future work, we plan to investigate methods for establishing statistical
bounds on the degree of improvement that online retraining yields in terms of
safety and performance of the NC. We also plan to incorporate techniques from
the L1Simplex architecture [35] to deal with deviations of the plant model’s
behavior from the actual behavior.
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